fact that he appointed men to the duma ranks. Yet the Muscovite sovereign did not rule alone, but rather with the aid of close relatives, advisors, and mentors.
8 The existence of a small retinue of advisors around the tsar was recognized by the Muscovites themselves: Gregorii Kotoshikhin, the treasonous scribe who penned the only indigenous description of the Muscovite political system, explicitly calls them the "close people" (blizhnye liudi). 9 The second major political interest at the Muscovite court were old elite servitors, that is, men of very high, heritable status whose families traditionally held positions in the duma ranks. These were Muscovy's aristocrats: for centuries, they had commanded Muscovy's armies, administered Muscovy's central offices, and governed Muscovy's far-flung territories. Their right to high offices was guarded by mestnichestvo, early Russia's mechanism for protecting the order of precedence. 10 Finally, we have men and families serving in the lower orders of the gosudarev dvor-the thousands of stol'niki, dvoriane moskovskie, and striapchie who occupied minor offices in Moscow and the provinces. They could never reasonably hope to win appointments to the duma. Figure 2 describes the three interest groups within the system of ranks.
Figure 2 : The Sov ereig n's Co urt (circa 1620)

THE POLITICAL ELITE
The Ts ar an d His Re tinue [2-4 families]
The T ra ditiona Explicitly rejecting late Imperial and Soviet conflict-based models, American scholars have emphasized the role of consensus among early Russian notables. 11 And rightfully so: the tsar, upper elite, and lower courtiers were all involved in the same collaborative enterprise-rule of the Muscovite state-and therefore generally cooperated with one another.
Though there certainly were episodes of political violence within the gosudarev dvor (the Oprichnina, during the Time of
Troubles, under Sophia and Peter), it is telling that the Muscovites never developed a formal institution that might represent differing political agendas among notables. None, apparently, was needed.
Yet consensus is only half the story. If we assume that all three actors were rational, and that they were in some measure self-interested, then it follows that the external structure of the Muscovite court itself brought their interests into opposition. This is because they were all in the market for what was, in essence, a scarce commodity-duma rank.
Control of the high ranks was unequal. The tsar held the largest share-he made all the appointments. The old elite held a smaller share-by Muscovite tradition, elite families had a special claim on the upper ranks, often passing them on through several generations. And the mass of courtiers held the smallest share-only very occasionally would the tsar reach down into the lower rungs of the court to elevate a common stol'nik, but the possibility was always open.
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Given this inequitable distribution, we can guess that each actor pursued a different strategy in the market for duma ranks. The tsar's course was one of balance: he attempted to distribute just enough of the ranks to elite servitors so as to guarantee their allegiance, while at the same time reserving a portion for the purposes of patronage, reward of merit, or some other end. Members of the old elite pursued a strategy of maintenance: they fought to preserve their hold on the duma ranks by keeping new servitors out of existing positions and preventing the tsar from minting new seats. The common courtiers' strategy was offensive: they used a variety of mechanisms to win favor with the tsar or elite (service, marriage alliances, etc.) in order to gain a place among the duma men. Like all durable systems, the Muscovite court experienced periods of equilibrium-moments in which the three parties were satisfied with the distribution of duma ranks-and periods of imbalance-times of dissatisfaction. In our simple model, movement from one state to another occurred when the relative power of one of the actors shifted in such a way that a new distribution became possible. Any change in the relative strength of one of the actors would, logically, invite a shift in the distribution of seats. Finally, it must be stressed that though each group of actors shared common interests, there is no prima facie evidence that they ever consciously acted as groups. Rather, like unorganized consumers in a market, they pursued common interests independently.
A Mod el for I nferring Du ma Ap point ment Po licy
The tsar, then, having carefully taken into account the constellation of political forces, appointed men from the gosudarev dvor to the duma ranks. We know from a great variety of sources that in selecting men for advance, he employed two general types of conflicting criteria-earned status and congenital status. 13 The Muscovite court was not meritocratic, but nonetheless men could distinguish themselves through excellent service, political savvy, or clever patronage and rise through the ranks. Neither was the court divided into completely hereditary castes, but nevertheless birth and birth alone was an extremely important determinant of a servitor's career pattern. In attempting to reconstruct duma appointment policy over the course of the seventeenth century, our task is to determine the relative importance of these two criteria in given eras and reigns. The ratio of the two factors offers us a way to infer the relative power of the tsar, the hereditary elite, and courtiers of lower status: when the tsar had more power, merit (broadly construed) was served at the expense of birth; when the old elite had more power, birth was served at the expense of merit.
The assumption that Muscovite politics was a zero sum game, though perhaps not entirely accurate, is justifiable on methodological grounds in so far as it enables us to concentrate on one of the two types of status. Such a move is important because, practically speaking, it is next to impossible to quantify earned status in the Muscovite context. The
Russians practiced no "grading" system for service of different types. Servitors did not receive points for different kinds of service according to any rational scheme. Besides, the service records of the vast majority of courtiers cannot be reconstructed fully on the basis of existing records, so the point is moot. Congenital status, in contrast, lends itself much more readily to measurement because its components were by and large binary-one had the status, or one did not.
Muscovite political practice suggests there were three such components: estate, heritage, and kinship. Estate is the simplest of the lot: in Muscovy, all subjects were cleanly divided between "princes" (kniaz'ia) and "commoners."
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Heritage is more complex. Among the Muscovite elite, the antiquity of one's lineage was a vital factor in social status.
Older clans, that is, ones that had entered Muscovite service long ago, were more esteemed than younger clans. 15 We will call older clans "pedigreed" and younger clans "unpedigreed." Finally, we have kinship. The Muscovite elite had a strong sense that families should maintain their possessions, including the duma ranks. 16 Practically speaking, nepotism meant that if a man were a "legacy,"-a servitor preceded in a rank by a kinsman-he was more likely than a "pioneer"-someone without a ranked kinsman-to succeed to that rank. One significant caveat must be made: we will consider only kinship in the male line, for both practical and historical reasons. Practically, it is quite easy to ascertain patrilineal kinship within the duma ranks due to the passage of surnames from father to son. In contrast, it is difficult to establish whether any two men were related through the female line due to the scarcity of evidence about women in general 13 Kotoshikhin, for example, wrote that "great families" (bolshie rody) served as boyars, but not okol'nichie; "lesser families" (rody menshi) served as boyars and okol'nichie; "middle-ranking" families (srednie rody), "descended from dvoriane" (iz dvorian), served as okol'nichie and dumnye dvoriane; dumnye d'iaki were always of "inferior birth" (porodoiu byvaet menshi), though they might achieve high station by virtue of their good works. The dumnyi d'iak's status was earned; the "great man's" was congenital. Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v carstvovanie Alekseja Mixajlovica, . Aleksei touches on the distinction. See "Nakazy boiarinu V. B. Sheremetevu," 544 and Buskovitch's excellent commentary on this letter (Bushkovitch, Peter the Great, (26) (27) (28) .
14 The term "commoner" is used to mean "untitled courtier" for brevity's sake. 15 We can see this distinction in action, for example, in mestnichestvo cases in which servitors appeal to the antiquity of their clan's service to the grand prince. Kollmann, By Honor Bound, . Kotoshikhin plainly said that clans were esteemed in proportion to their length of service. Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v carstvovanie Alekseja Mixajlovica, fol. 34. 16 For decades and even centuries, clans passed seats in the high ranks through generations from one member to the next. See Kollmann, Kinship and Politics, Aristocrats and Servitors, [25] [26] [27] . Kotoshikhin simply assumed that ranks were in some sense heritable. Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v carstvovanie Alekseja Mixajlovica, (genealogies almost never mention them) and marriages in particular (there were no marriage registries). Historically, much evidence suggests that patrilineal ties were more important than matrilineal, though this is not to deny that the latter were, in many instances, crucial. Marriage of women into the royal family offers a clear, if likely exaggerated, example of the "boost" that candidates might receive through marriage: the Streshnevy, Miloslavskie, Naryshkiny and Lopukhiny all placed members in the duma ranks after one of their own had married the tsar. It should be remembered, however, that the Dolgorukie, Apraksiny and Grushevskie did not receive the same benefit from their royal marital alliances.
It is true that in practice some princes had more status than others, some pedigreed men had more status than others, and some legacies had more status than others. But for our purposes this subtly is not important. All that matters here is that on average men with the higher characteristic had more congenital status than those with the lower characteristic. Certainly there will be exceptions, but they will be only that.
Using three types of congenital status described above, we can investigate in detail alterations in duma appointment policy over the course of the seventeenth century. Figure 3 describes this technique. In this model, candidates for election are endowed with inherited political assets (estate, kinship and heritage) that combine to determine their cumulative congenital status. Duma appointment policy dictated the selection criteria, which was figured in terms of the amount of cumulative congenital status successful candidates had to possess. The results of this selection process are reflected in relative career success, which is measured by attainment of one or more duma ranks. Our technique for reconstructing duma appointment policy is, therefore, inferential: we will first correlate the degree of congenital status with career success in different periods and then infer the appointment policy that had to be operative at the time in order to produce this result. S. Selivanovskogo, 1853). As there is no correlation between congenital status, career success and the alphabetical order of a servitor's name in Ivanov, this selection is random for these purposes. The sample of 1489 men from Ivanov was investigated in the archival copies of the Boyar Books in Moscow (Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi archiv drevnikh aktov (RGADA), fond 210, boiarskie knigi). Each of the entries was found in the Boyar Books on the folios indicated by Ivanov, suggesting that his index is quite accurate.
18 The list of men appointed to the boyar ranks was constructed by inspection of the boiarskie knigi and boiarskie spiski held in RGADA, fond 210 and supplemented by information found in Crummey, Aristocrats and Servitors, 178-214.
19 Sources used to construct a list of families that placed members in the duma ranks prior to 1613 include: Margarita E. Bychkova, Sostav klassa feodalov Rossii v XVI v. Istoriko-genealogicheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Nauka, 1986 ); Nancy Shields Kollmann, Kinship and Politics; Stepan B. Veselovskii, Issledovaniia po istorii klassa sluzhilykh zemlevladel'tsev (Moscow: Nauka, 1969) ; Aleksandr A. Zimin, "Sostav Boiarskoi dumy XV-XVI vekakh," Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1957 (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958), 41-87; and Aleksandr A. Zimin, Formirovanie boiarskoi aristokratii v Rossii v vtoroi polovine XV-pervoi treti XVI v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1988) . 20 In point of fact, each of these factors had a different impact on a servitor's career chances. Detailed statistical analysis suggests that kinship was most influential, followed by heritage and estate (these being almost exactly equivalent). See Marshall Poe, The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century. Volume 2: A Quantitative Analysis of the "Duma Ranks," 1613-1713 (forthcoming, Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Sciences), Chapter 6. The differences in question, however, are relatively slight, therefore we are fully justified in assigning them equivalent values. 
Ta ble 1: Statu s T yp es and St atu s Co hort s (1613-1713)
Cong enita l Statu s a nd Du ma Ap point ment Po licy , 1613-1 713
In purely statistical terms, appointment to any duma rank was very unlikely: only 483 of 14890 men at court were chosen for duma service over the course of the century, about 3%. For the average servitor at court, therefore, the chances of being appointed to the duma ranks were about one in 30. But not all servitors were "average." In fact, a servitor's expectations of advance to the duma ranks varied with his congenital status. This can he seen in Table 2 , which compares the percentage of men in the point cohorts at court and in the duma ranks. Obviously, higher congenital status was directly related to the chances of appointment: men with three points-the hereditary elite-could reasonably anticipate appointment to the duma ranks, while men with zero points-common courtiers-had no such illusions.
If appointed to the duma ranks, men with high status entered at a higher level than their low status counterparts. In Table 3 , the correlation between status and entry rank is direct: most men with three points entered as boyars; most men with two points entered as okol'nichie, most men with one point entered as okol'nichie or dumnye dvoriane, most men with zero points entered as dumnye dvoriane and dumnye d'iaki.
Not only were men with high status more likely to be appointed to the duma ranks and more likely to enter at a high rank, they were much more likely to end their careers at the top of the hierarchy. This is apparent in 34 % [42] 65 %[80] 32 % [39] If he were appointed to the duma ranks, a man with three status points could fully expect to achieve the rank of boyar in the course of his career-83% of such men did. Similarly, duma men with two status points, once appointed to the duma ranks, could expect to achieve either boyar (58%) or okol'nichii (58%). Men in the one-point status group were unlikely to advance to boyar, but they had a reasonable expectation of achieving okol'nichii (63%) or dumnyi dvorianin (45%) after appointment to the duma ranks. Finally, duma men with zero status points might achieve okol'nichii, but were much more likely to end their careers as dumnye dvoriane (65%).
22 Note that the cumulative total for the percentages in the rows is greater than the total percentages of men in the point groups because men could hold more than one rank in their careers.
The data presented establishes that duma appointment policy over the entire century strongly favored men with high congenital status. Having set this century-long framework, we are now in a good position to investigate changes in duma appointment policy over time. We can begin by charting the growth of the duma ranks and the Sovereign's Court in the seventeenth century. This is done in Chart 1, which tracks the absolute size of both cohorts over the course of the century.
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As we can see, the size of both the duma ranks and the court grew dramatically, particularly after the reign of Mikhail. As a rule, Mikhail appointed men to the duma ranks to replace losses. Therefore in his reign the duma cohort was stable at about 35 members. In like fashion, he seems to have held the size of the court steady at about 2000 men.
Aleksei eliminated the "replacement" policy of his father and substituted one aimed at growth. In his reign the duma cohort grew to about 70 men and the court to approximately 5000 servitors. Fedor, Sophia, and (initially, at least) Peter all followed Aleksei's policy of growth, though more aggressively. Under Fedor, the duma cohort grew to about 100 men; under Sophia, to about 150 men; and under Peter, to about 165 men. Courtiers multiplied as well, though not at the same rate. In the early 1690s, Peter lost interest in the duma ranks, stopped making new appointments, and the duma cohort steadily declined as its occupants died.
Within this secular trend, we can clearly detect certain local patterns. The most notable is the pattern of growth: the duma cohort did not expand gradually, but in short bursts of appointments that followed the accession of a new monarch, beginning in Aleksei's reign and gaining strength in Fedor's. In 1645 Aleksei appointed 11 new members to the duma ranks, more than in any single year in Mikhail's reign. Over the next decade he appointed 64 men to the duma 23 Accurate data on the size of the court are available only for years in which there are complete Boyar Books, namely, 1627 Books, namely, , 1629 Books, namely, , 1636 Books, namely, , 1639 Books, namely, , 1658 Books, namely, , 1667 Books, namely, , 1676 Books, namely, , and 1691 . See Mikhail P. Lukichev, "Boiarskie knigi XVII v. kak istoricheskii istochnik" (Kand. Diss., MGIAI, 1984) and idem, "Obzor boiarskikh knig XVII v.," Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1979 g. (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1980), 255-66. ranks-Mikhail appointed 64 men during his entire reign. At that point, Aleksei's rate of appointment slowed considerably.
He replaced men who exited and, for the last 20 years of his reign, maintained the duma ranks at about 70 men. But at the accession of each of his successors, Aleksei's precedent was followed as new rulers rapidly appointed large numbers of their own men to the duma ranks: in the first year of their reigns, Fedor, Sophia, and Peter appointed 30, 44, and 19 men to the duma cohort respectively.
What kind of men did respective sovereigns appoint? We can begin to answer this question by investigating the status composition of the duma ranks and court over time. This is done in Table 5 , which compares the two proportions (the "Court" and "Duma" columns) for selected years and describes the factor by which upper status men were overand lower status men under-represented in selection for the elite ranks (the "Bias" column). The message of Table 5 is clear and striking: the advantage afforded men of high status diminished throughout the century. Three-point men were consistently over-represented in the duma ranks by a very wide margin (+20x over the whole period). Yet the degree to which the selection process was biased in their favor declined severely over the course of the century (from +18x to +10x). 25 Two-point men were also over-represented by a wide margin (+4.1x) in the upper orders throughout the century. They did not, however, suffer from a significant loss in advantage, as can be seen by the relative stability of their degree of over-representation (from +2.3x to +3.9x).
26 In comparison to the other groups, onepoint men were treated (from a statistical point of view) "fairly": their proportion in the court was closely matched by their proportion in the duma ranks, suggesting no bias whatsoever. Nevertheless, they were the only group to move 24 When analyzing the impact of status on the selection of men from the dvor to the duma ranks, it is important to understand the statistical concept of "selection bias." If a binary selection from a population is said to be statistically "fair," then the proportions of two items in the sample should approximate the proportion of the two items in the pool from which the sample was taken. In an "unfair" selection, the two proportions will diverge, suggesting that the selection process (and the selector) was biased in some way. A simple example illustrates this intuitive notion. Princes made up approximately 12% of the court, but comprised exactly 34% of men in the duma ranks. They were over-represented by a factor of +2.83x (= 34%/12%). Correspondingly, commoners made up approximately 88% of the court, while they comprised only 66% of servitors in the upper orders. They were under-represented by a factor of -1.33x (88%/66%). Thus we conclude that the selection process-this aspect of the appointment policy-was biased in favor of princes by 2.83 times and against commoners by 1.33 times. The higher the factor of over-representation, the greater the bias for (+) or against (-) the group in question.
25 The "bulge" in 1639 is likely the result of a sampling accident, that is, it is the result of a very unlikely statistical event rather than a reflection of any change in the composition of the court. It seems more likely that three-point men continued to make up between one and two percent of the court in this period.
26 The "bulge" in 1636 and 1639 probably reflects the decline in the percentage of three-point men in the duma ranks and the consequent rise in proportion of two-point men rather than any reversal of policy. from (slight) under-representation to (slight) over-representation in the upper orders (-1.2x to +1.5x).
27 Finally, there was always a prejudice against the appointment of men with zero status points to the duma ranks, for they were consistently under-represented in the upper orders (-2.8x over the period). It should be said, however, that their fortunes improved dramatically over the course of the century, as can be seen in the nearly serial decline in the degree of underrepresentation they suffered (from -4.4x to -2.5x).
The result of the decline in the importance of high status was reflected in status composition of the four duma ranks.
Chart 2 traces the number of duma men in each status group over the course of the century.
The number of all types of men grew (until the early 1690s, when appoints to the duma ranks ceased), but the relative proportion of each group shifted dramatically. The weight of lower status men (with one and zero points) rose, while that of upper status men (with three and two points) fell rapidly. This is evident in Chart 3, which graphs the percentage of the duma cohort made up by members of each status group.
27 The "trough" in 1658 would seem to be the result of unusual sampling in the court tally, rather than a shift in policy.
The ranks of the lower status elements began to grow consistently in the reign of Aleksei. By about 1654, the percentage of the duma cohort made up by the lower status groups began a serial increase and that of the upper two cohorts (logically) a serial decrease. By about 1670, the four groups had equal weight in the duma cohort.
The relative decline of the high status groups was primarily a result of a conscious shift in appointment policy, rather than a shift in the composition of the court. This fact is clear in Table 5 above. Note that the make up of the court-the candidate pool for selection-remained relatively stable over the course of the century, while the make up of the duma ranks-those selected-changed dramatically. Statistically it follows that if the composition of the candidate pool remained the same, and the composition of the selected group changed, then the criteria for selection must have been altered. In a word, the policy was intentionally changed. Table 6 enables us to see who-or at least what regime-changed it. This table compares the percentage of men of various status at court (the "Court" column) with the percentage of the same among all those appointed to the duma ranks by successive monarchs (the "Apps." column). Clearly, Aleksei consciously "lowered the bar" for advancement to the duma ranks: high status men were not as preferred as they had been under Mikhail, and lower status men were not as disadvantaged. This shift in policy continued under Aleksei's successors. They, too, altered duma appointment policy so as to increase the opportunities of lower status men. It is interesting to note, however, that zero-point men did not benefit appreciably from the shift in policy after the reign of Aleksei.
Ta ble 6: The Statu s Co mp ositio n of t he Duma Co hort a nd Court b y R eign (1613-1713)
The consequence of this progressive "lowering of the bar" can be seen in the changing composition of the duma ranks over the course of the century. In order to set a benchmark, we will begin by investigating the status composition of the four ranks over the course of the century. As we might anticipate, men with higher aggregate status tended to congregate in the upper ranks (the appointment policy was biased in their favor), while men with lower aggregate status tended to find places in the lower ranks (the policy was biased against them). This regularity is made plain in Table 7 . It shows the distribution of the status types in each rank. Three-point men made up only 1% of the court, so they were massively over-represented among boyars (+38x) and okol'nichie (+13x). As all three-point men were princes, they never became dumnye dvoriane or dumnye d'iaki (the rules prohibited princes being appointed to these ranks). Similarly, two-point men, who made up 7% of the court, were widely over-represented among boyars (+5.6x) and okol'nichie (+5.1x). Very few of them ever entered the lower two ranks. The status of one-point men was too low to allow them to be boyars in great numbers and too high to permit them to be appointed to dumnyi d'iak -thus they were under-represented in both ranks (-1.3x and -1.7x). Their ranks were okol'nichii and dumnyi dvorianin, in which they comprised a large percentage (33% and 38%) and were over-represented (+1.5 and +1.7). Men with no status points had too little honor to be made boyars and okol'nichie and were, as we might expect, significantly under-represented in both ranks (-11.5 and -3.8) . They made up the bulk of dumnye dvoriane and dumnye d'iaki (55% and 85%).
28
Ta ble 7: Cu mulative St atus and t he D um a Ra nks (1613-1713)
This century-long structure, however, masks significant changes in the status composition of each rank, changes that were the direct consequence of an evolving duma appointment policy. Throughout most of the seventeenth century, the 28 Note that this table registers the total number of men who ever held the ranks specified. Because a man might hold several ranks in the course of his career, the totals are higher than the number of men in the duma ranks (483). rank of boyar remained the nearly exclusive preserve of men in the upper status cohorts, as can be clearly seen in Chart 4, which compares the number of men in the four status groups in the boyar rank, and Chart 5, which does the same in terms of percentage.
Until the reigns of Sophia and Peter, men with two and three points predominated in the boyar rank; thereafter, men with one and two points began to achieve the highest rank in large numbers. Men with zero points never made up more than 10% of the boyar rank. The subtle shift of appointment policy brought by Sophia is reflected in Table 8, which shows the proportion of all men appointed and promoted to boyar in given reigns comprised by men in the four status cohorts. (161 3-1713 The boyar appointment policies of Mikhail, Aleksei, and Fedor were similar: about half of all men appointed to boyar had three points, a bit more than a third had two points, and something above 10% had fewer points. Perhaps due to the power of the old families, even Aleksei did not dare radically alter the status criteria for being appointed boyar. Note, however, the initial appearance of zero-point men among the boyars occurred under Aleksei. With the accession of Sophia we see a sudden shift: the bulk of men appointed to boyar in her reign and Peter's had one and two points.
Ta ble 8: A dvanc em ent to Boy ar an d Statu s b y R eign
Simultaneously, the degree to which three-point men were over-represented among boyars declines dramatically (from +15.7x to +9x). It took time, but by the 1680s the "new men" had begun to enter the highest rank in significant numbers.
Men of middling and lower status were far more successful in achieving the rank of okol'nichii, as is apparent in Chart 6, which compares the number of men in the four status groups in the second rank, and Chart 7, which does the same in terms of percentage.
Though men with three and two points tended to dominate the rank (numerically and proportionately), they lost their grip in the middle third of the century as more and more men with one and zero points were advanced into the rank.
This alteration of policy can be seen in Table 9 , which displays the percentage of all men appointed and promoted to okol'nichii in given reigns comprised of men in the four status cohorts. The appointment policies of Mikhail and Aleksei regarding okol'nichii show broad similarities: 20% three-point men, 45%
Ta ble 9: A dvanc em ent to Oko l'nic hii a nd St atus by R eign (1613-1713)
two-point men, 20% one-point men, and 15% zero-point men. With the arrival of Fedor, however, we see a manifest change in approach: the percentage of men with three points made okol'nichii declines with every successive monarch (25%>9%>7%>2%); the degree of three-point over-representation declines (from +12x to +2x); the percentage of men appointed to the second rank with two points stagnates (at about 30%); and, most significant, the percentage of men appointed to okol'nichii with zero and one point increases in every successive reign. The explanation for this change is clear: in the second half of the century, the "new men" began to reach the rank of okol'nichii with increasing frequency, slightly before they began to enter the rank of boyar.
In contrast to boyar, which was dominated by high status men, and okol'nichii, which was a transitional rank, dumnyi dvorianin was nothing other than conduit for "new men" into the duma ranks. This fact is made plain by Chart 8, which records the number of men of various status in the third rank and Chart 9, which does the same in terms of percentage.
Beginning early in the reign of Aleksei, men with zero points-"new men"-were made dumnye dvoriane with increasing frequency.
As we have indicated, Aleksei brought them into the duma ranks as dumnye dvoriane because he had no other option: men of such low status could not be appointed as boyars or okol'nichie (at this time in the century) and the particular men in question were not from the administrative class, so they could not be brought in as dumnye d'iaki. Shortly after a number of zero-point dumnye dvoriane appeared, they were joined by dumnye dvoriane with one point. The explanation for this is clear: zero-point pioneers were sponsoring their kinsmen into the duma ranks, and they-upon appointment as dumnye dvoriane-became legacies (hence one point). The two groups, zero-and one-point, dominated the rank for the remainder of the century. The policy shift that brought these lower status men into the duma ranks can be seen in Table   10 , which compares the number of men in the four status cohorts appointed or promoted to dumnyi dvorianin by successive rulers. The break that occurred with the accession of Aleksei is manifest. He established an appointment regime for dumnyi dvorianin that remained in force with very little change throughout the century: between 5% and 10% of appointments would have two points; between 35% and 45% would have one point; and between 50% and 65% would have zero points.
The story is similar for dumnyi d'iak: the rank was dominated throughout the century by men of low status, especially men with zero points. This fact can be seen in Chart 10, which records the number of men of various status in the fourth rank and Chart 11, which does the same in terms of percentage. One proviso is in order: since the total number of dumnye d'iaki in the data set is small, the wild fluctuations in Chart 11 are not terribly significant.
Practically speaking, royal appointment policy concerning the status of men serving as dumnye d'iaki remained unchanged throughout the century: men of three-and two-point status were excluded from consideration, men of one-point status were very occasionally appointed, and the overwhelming bulk of appointees to the rank would be of the lowest status. Here again it is important to recall that, due to the small numbers involved, the percentages are not of great significance.
Nevertheless, it is clear that seventeenth-century Russian sovereigns considered the rank of dumnyi d'iak below the honor of men with two and three points. On rare occasions, a man with one point might be made dumnyi d'iak (for example, a legacy). By and large, however, all dumnye d'iaki were recruited from the administrative class, a class that included no princes and no men with distinguished lineages.
Conclusi on: T he Demi se of t he Ro man ov Sett lement
What, then, can we conclude about changes in the seventeenth-century Russian political system? Our most general observation must be this: successive monarchs intentionally "lowered the bar" for advancement from the gosudarev dvor to the duma ranks. Under Mikhail, one virtually had to have very high inherited status to win appointment to the duma ranks; by Peter's time, men of lower status were often promoted to the higher ranks. The key figure in this development was Aleksei: he consciously increased the size and altered the composition of the duma ranks by allowing a small but growing number of lower status "new men" into its midst. His successors followed suit. This argument, however, would seem to be incomplete in two ways. First, it fails to put Aleksei's reform into the context of the court and the patronage system that operated within it. Kliuchevskii and those who followed him seem to have been aware that the court grew in the seventeenth century, but they never connected this development with the arrival of the "new men," at least explicitly. Yet the two developments were probably related. Evidence from the Boyar Books suggests that the court was growing in the 1650s: in the last decade of Mikhail's reign, it had comprised about 2000 servitors, while in the first decade of Aleksei's reign it had probably expanded to 2500 or even 3000 men. These new entrants lobbied for places in the duma ranks. Just how they did so remains completely obscure, but we might surmise that Aleksei bowed to pressure and increased the number of duma appointments to satisfy the new courtiers. As we've seen, the duma ranks expanded with the court.
Yet the fact that Aleksei was able to promote "new men" in this way presents us with a puzzle, for by Muscovite tradition the tsar was neither free to distribute existing duma positions as he liked, nor was he absolutely free to mint new positions. And here we come to the second deficiency of Kliuchevskii's thesis: it fails to place Aleksei's reform in its probable political context-the silent struggle between a forward-looking tsar, his traditional elite, and the "new men" who were flooding the court. So far as I know, we have no direct evidence of this pivotal political battle. Circumstantial evidence, however, suggests that it took place, probably during around the Thirteen Years' War (1654-67). Prior to that conflict, the hereditary elite was still in control of the duma ranks: in 1653, three and two point men together out numbered one and zero point men 48 (69%) to 21 (31%), and they completely dominated the ranks of boyar and The shift toward lower status appointments is evident, if not dramatic. In the earlier period, Aleksei appointed many more high status men than low status men; during the war, the two groups were called on with almost equal frequency.
Again (see Table 6 ), one notes that zero-point men did not benefit from the shift in appointment policy.
If we look briefly at the identity of the men appointed in the two eras the difference in policy becomes much clearer.
In the early period, a young Aleksei appointed a considerable number of lower class men to the duma ranks, but they are often in-laws, favorites, or clients of his mentor B. I. Morozov. 33 During the war, the mature Aleksei made some such appointments, 34 but he also advanced classic "new men"-experienced servitors with demonstrated worth, though lacking in congenital status. 35 Before being appointed to the duma ranks, these men often occupied crucial military and administrative offices. Yet their efforts were not rewarded with duma appointments. Aleksei remedied this problem.
It stands to reason, however, that Aleksei faced resistance in this effort to "open careers to talent." For centuries, the traditional boyar clans had dominated the duma ranks, and at the on-set of the war they continued to do so. It was in their vested interest to resist any effort to bring in "new men," either by replacing traditional elites or by appointing them to new positions. Again, there is no direct evidence that they fought Aleksei. But we do have two excellent pieces of circumstantial evidence: the gradual pattern of Aleksei's advancement of the "new men" and the re-creation of the rank of dumnyi dvorianin. The tsar did not bring the "new men" in all at once. He could not do so without risking a costly and dangerous political battle with the old elites. Rather, he pursued a conservative approach, appointing a few "new men" at time. But even here his options were limited by the hold of the old elites over the upper ranks. Aleksei knew that they would likely grumble if he promoted men of lower status to the highest ranks in the duma orders, for these were the traditional preserve of the old elite. Neither could Aleksei make the more honorable of the "new men" dumnye d'iaki, for that rank was deemed too low for the hereditary servitors in the gosudarev dvor. Therefore Aleksei opted for a strategy that would at once appease the hereditary boiarstvo and permit him to promote the "new men": he transformed the rank of dumnyi dvorianin. The chronology of events is telling. In 1650, Aleksei took the unprecedented step of appointing a fifth man to dumnyi dvorianin. Prior to that act, the largest number of dumnye dvoriane had been four (in 1634 and 1635), and ordinarily there had only been one. By the first year of the war, there were eight of them. During the war, 
